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Neither economics nor political science can explain the process of modern social development.  The
fact that developed societies always have developed economies and developed polities suggests that
the connection between economics and politics must be a fundamental part of the development process.
This paper develops an integrated theory of economics and politics.  We show how, beginning 10,000
years ago, limited access social orders developed that were able to control violence, provide order,
and allow greater production through specialization and exchange.  Limited access orders provide
order by using the political system to limit economic entry to create rents, and then using the rents
to stabilize the political system and limit violence.  We call this type of political economy arrangement
a natural state.  It appears to be the natural way that human societies are organized, even in most of
the contemporary world.  In contrast, a handful of developed societies have developed open access
social orders.  In these societies, open access and entry into economic and political organizations sustains
economic and political competition.  Social order is sustained by competition rather than rent-creation.
The key to understanding modern social development is understanding the transition from limited
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I Introduction
The fundamental question of economic history can be asked in two ways: how did a handful of
countries achieve sustained rates of economic growth and development in the late 18
th and early
19
th centuries? or why have most nations failed to achieve sustained economic growth over the
last three hundred years?  What historical process(es) have generated institutions in a handful of
countries capable of sustained economic development in the twentieth century, while most
countries still fail to develop thriving markets, competitive and stable politics, and cultures that
promote deep human capital accumulation for most of their populations?  Economists have
thoroughly documented that no one factor explains economic development – not capital
accumulation, human capital, resource endowments, international trade, or geographical location
to name a few prominent examples.  Instead, the complex ways that societies structure human
relationships – the institutions that shape economic, political, religious, and other interactions –
appear to be the key to understanding why some societies are capable of sustained economic and
political development (North 1981, 1990, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2002, Greif 2005,
Rodrik, Subramian, and Trebbi 2004).  What are the fundamental aspects of political and
economic institutions that vary across developed and non-developed societies?
We build our answer to the question on North’s (1991) observation that while institutions
frame all human behavior, it is through organizations that people carry out complex social
interactions.  Understanding human development requires understanding how institutions shape
the kind of organizations available for sustainable human cooperation.  Developed societies are
filled with a rich variety of complicated and sophisticated organizations capable of producing4
goods and services, carrying out research and development, and coordinating individual behavior
on a scale never before seen in human history.  
The most powerful and central organization in any society is, of course, the state.  Every
society has to solve the fundamental problem of providing social order.  In the simplest terms,
human violence must be prevented or contained.  Providing order is the primary function of a
state.  
We sketch a conceptual framework, really the skeleton of such a framework, that
illuminates the central structures enabling human societies to order themselves.  Sustaining
social order requires the development of a state organization capable of limiting violence, and
that requires that political and economic systems work in concert.  The fundamental contribution
of our approach is integrating a theory of economic behavior with a theory of political behavior
by demonstrating how political systems manipulate the economy in order to sustain political
stability, limit violence, and provide social order.
Historically, societies have been ordered in three ways.  The first social order dominated
pre-recorded human history: the primitive social order is a kind of hunter-gatherer society.  The
second social order has dominated the last 10,000 years, what amounts to recorded human
history: limited access orders solve the problem of containing violence by political manipulation
of the economic system to generate rents by limiting entry to provide social stability and order. 
As we show, violence jeopardizes the rents, so individuals who receive rents have an incentive to
suppress violence and to support the current regime.  The third social order arose over the last
300 years: open access orders sustain social order through political and economic competition5
rather than rent-creation.  Open access orders have developed in about two dozen countries, and
all are both economically and politically developed.
Broadening our focus to encompass economic and political systems brings out the
necessity for the concept of a social order.  Social orders are composed of constituent systems,
such as the economic, political, military, and religious systems.  Organizations are central to all
aspects of social order – economic, political, religious, and social. Each of the three primary
social orders – the primitive order, the limited access order, and the open access order – structure
organizations in different ways.  Organizations are groups of individuals, more or less directed
toward a common goal.  Most human activities involve a degree of cooperation among
individuals and, because cooperation and coordination directly affect productivity, the ability to
support complex, sophisticated organizations is central to economic growth. 
The institutional structure of a society determines the kind of organizations that can be
created and sustained.  Primitive social orders cannot support complex organizations. Limited
access societies support complex organizations, but restrict the number of complex
organizations. Limited access orders create and distribute rents by limiting the ability to create
organizations.  Open access societies support open access to organizations.  This fosters
economic and political competition, and it results in a rich array of complex economic and
political organizations. 
The characteristic way in which a social order structures human organizations also
produces predictable features of the larger society.  Limited access orders exhibit systematic
rent-creation, market power, privileges, and differences between elites and others; they also
preclude thriving markets and long-term economic development. Open access orders exhibit6
systematic competition, entry, and mobility; they also foster thriving markets and long-term
economic development. 
All economically developed countries are also politically developed.  The source of
development is the transition from a limited access to an open access society.  Our framework
acknowledges that political and economic systems are organically related, as they are both parts
of the same social order.  What we call the theory of the double balance suggests that economic
and political systems both tend to be open access or to be limited access.  The double balance
implies that sustaining fundamental changes in either the economic or political system cannot
occur without fundamental changes in the other.  Understanding the forces maintaining a balance
between political and economic institutions is critically important to our understanding of both
the stability of the various orders and to the transition between limited and open access societies. 
Small wonder, then, that both development economics and the international donor community
have failed to produce a formula for economic development through incremental policy changes. 
In the paper that follows we first lay out the logic of how institutions develop that can
control violence.  We call this the natural state.  The logic of the natural state implies limited
access, and thus underlies the operation of a limited access order.  With the natural state logic in
hand, we define our concepts more carefully.  We then  describe limited access orders and open
access orders in more detail.  The final section lays out a framework for understanding the
transition from limited access to open access societies.  Understanding the transition is the holy
grail, for it is the process of modern social development.
II. Literature7
Our conceptual framework is connected to the rich literature on the political economy of
development in many ways. The literature is vast, but we have four specific areas in mind.  In
each case we view our work as supplementing, rather than supplanting, existing ideas and
empirical results.  This brief review indicates some of the high points of these literatures, it is not
intended to be complete or exhaustive.
Over the past two decades, the economics literature on development has exploited the
availability of data on the performance of a wide group of countries over substantial periods of
time to produced a wealth of studies based on cross sections and panels of countries.  The work
most closely related to ours builds on North, who emphasizes institutions (North 1981, 1990)
and credible commitments (North and Weingast 1989, Levy and Spiller 1994, and Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2005).  The specific focus of Acemoglu and Robinson on how it is possible for elites
to manage to share power relates directly to our ideas about the transition from limited to open
access societies.  The critical role played by the persistence of institutions emphasized by
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) and by Engerman and Sokoloff (2005) is important
evidence about the stability of the natural state as a social order and the extreme difficultly in
making a transition.  The importance of institutions as explanatory variables in quantitative
analyses of long term growth in this literature is emphasized by Rodrik, Subramian, and Trebbi’s
(2004) title, “Institutions Rule” (see also Greif 2005).  A related literature focuses on aspects of
the rule of law and governance, including the work of Knack and Keefer (1994), LaPorta,
Djankov, Glaeser, Lopes-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003), and Kauffman and Kray (200*).
The second major area of research has come to be known as the new institutional
economics (NIE).  The most recent major contribution is Grief (2005), but this literature8
stretches back in time at least as far as Coase’s seminal article on “The Nature of the Firm”
(1937).  The theory of the firm figures prominently in NIE work, notably with Williamson
(1985) and Milgrom and Roberts (1992), who among others developed the idea of credible
commitments within organizations that could produce self-enforcing agreements, even in the
absence of a state to enforce contracts as a third party.  The core insight into the structure of the
natural state obviously builds on this work.
A second line of thinking in the NIE focuses on the theory of the state, specifically North
(1981, 1990), Olson (1982 and 1993), Levi (1988), and Barzel (2001).  We build on their basic
insights, but extend them by explicitly considering the state as an organization, which allows us
to articulate how the polity and economy interact.  We have, however, turned Olson’s ideas
about the role of organized groups on its head.  The proliferation of organized groups in an open
access order produces a good outcome, not a bad outcome.  
A third line of thinking in the NIE relates to cognition, beliefs, and institutions.  North
(2005) and Grief (2005) grapple with the problem of cognition and the formation of beliefs.  We
touch briefly on the importance of belief formation in this paper, but it receives much greater
treatment in our larger book project.
The third major area of research is economic history.  The deepest vein in twentieth
century economic history addresses the question of why Europe? Several different approaches
point toward similar conclusions (including Landes 1999, Jones 1998, Rosenberg & Birdzell
1987, and North 1981, 1990, 2005): the presence of competition, at both the level of economic
organizations and the level of states; the importance of the emergence, specification, and
enforcement of property rights and institutions; the autonomy of organizations; and the9
1Recently, economic historians have addressed the issue of why Latin America fell
behind (Haber 1999), contrasting the Latin American experience with that of Western Europe. 
transformation from personal exchange to impersonal exchange (North 1981, Greif 2005).
1 
What Jones sees as the result of political fragmentation and competition in Europe and
Rosenberg & Birdzell term the autonomy of economic organizations, we see has the emergence
of open access.  Weber focused on identical questions in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism, although he reached different conclusions than we do about why Europe was unique. 
But Weber’s (1947) emphasis on the importance of organizations as central to understanding the
operation of societies is very much in line with our focus on institutions and organizations. 
Marx (1992) termed as capitalist what we call open access, and by hypothesizing that material
conditions determined political arrangements, he failed to capture both sides of the double
balance.  Adam Smith (1776) of course was the first advocate of an explicit and conscious open
access economic order.  
Our fourth and final literature is the more diffuse body of work on political development.
One of the principle problems with this literature is that there is no agreement about what
constitutes political development, although most agree that democracy must be a central part.
Our work builds on Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) who ask why elites would choose to give up
power and share it with the masses or the poor. 
An enormous subset of this literature asks about the relationship between economic
development and democracy. Lipset (1959) argues that economic development promotes
democracy. A vast literature emphasizes the strong correlation between development and
democracy (e.g., Barro 1997, Diamond 1992). But many scholars question whether this10
2For violence in primitive societies see Keeley, War Before Civilization, and LeBlanc,
Contested Battles.  
relationship is causal. Przeworski, et al. (2000), for example, argue that democracy is no more
likely to form at lower or higher levels of income, but that democracy is far less likely to degrade
into authoritarianism at higher levels of income. In this view, the relationship not causal, but a
selection effect reflecting democracy’s greater likelihood of surviving in richer countries.
Finally, another huge literature in political science and economics emphasizes the
importance of crony capitalism (Campos and Root 1996; Haber, Razo, and Maurer 2004),
patronage networks (Scott 1972), clientelism (Huntington 1968), and more generally, of
corruption (Heidenheimer, Johnston, and Levine 1989, Nye 1967, Rose-Ackerman 1979, Scott
1972, Shleifer and Vishny 1993, and Wallis 2005).  Our concept of a limited access order and
the natural state are generalizations of ideas about corruption.
III. The Logic of the Natural State
Our point of departure is a world of endemic violence.  The anthropological literature on
primitive societies suggest that most primitive societies were extremely violent.
2  Most modern
societies experience episodic civil war and breakdown of order, and the twentieth century proved
one of the bloodiest of all times.  Whether the problem is the development of a social order de
novo or whether it is the re-establishment of order in the midst of chaos, every society has to
develop mechanisms to ensure or restore order.  The benefits of even moderate limits on
violence are large enough to gain support from most non-elites as well as elites.11
  We begin with a stylized problem.  Imagine a population made up of many small groups
and no well organized states or military forces.  Some individuals specialize in violence, and all
individuals must stand ready to defend their rights by force of arms.  Imagine two specialists in
violence living in close geographic proximity.  They may provide protection to a small group of
clients, but the biggest threat they face is each other.  If they try to reach an agreement not to
fight, the first specialist to put down his arms risks being attacked and killed by the other.  Thus,
it is an equilibrium outcome for both specialists to continue fighting.  
The problem facing the violence specialists is their rational expectation that the other
specialist will not refrain from fighting.  This means that preventing violence requires that the
commitment not to fight be credible on both sides.  If the two specialists recognize each other’s
rights to land, labor, and resources they control, then a solution is possible to the problem.  The
two specialists agree to honor each other’s property rights to all the land, labor, and capital they
individually control.  All of the surplus produced by their assets are rents to the specialists. 
Since everyone, violent and non-violent, is more productive in the absence of warfare, then the
land, labor, and capital that each specialist controls produces more rents if there is peace. 
If the gains from peace are large enough, both specialists will find it in their interests and
within their abilities to credibly commit not to fight.  By recognizing each other’s rights to
exploit land, labor, and capital, the two specialists create a fund of rents that enables them both
to credibly commit not to fight each other.  The specialists do not disarm, indeed they must
maintain their military strength both to balance each other’s power and to overawe their
respective clients.  Because their agreement not to fight produces the rents holding the agreement
together, the maintenance of the agreement between the specialists requires constant attention12
3Mancur Olson’s (1993) roving and stationary bandits and Douglass North’s (1981)
revenue maximizing monarchs are at the center of the two most persuasive attempts to explain
the interrelated behavior of economies and polities.  With all due respect, we submit that
modeling the state as a single actor is inherently flawed.  Unless we understand the dynamics of
relationships within the organization of the state, we can never understand the interrelationship
of politics and economics.
and adjustment as circumstances change.  By virtue of their relative strength, the specialists can
assign and enforce their own exclusive property rights.  They create a set of incentive-
compatible institutional arrangements that provide for a nascent state, for property rights, for
economic growth, and for the provision of some social order.
The creation of a state by two specialists in violence highlights some aspects of states
that economists have not well grasped.  First, the state is inherently an organization: it is a group
of individuals pursuing a mix of common and individual goals through partially coordinated
action.  No states are individuals.  The idea of a revenue maximizing monarch or a stationary
bandit as a single actor “representative agent” of the state misses the fundamental reality that all
states are organizations.
3  
Second, the formation of the state provides a first order solution to the problem of
limiting violence by inducing the most powerful members of society to create arrangements that
reduce their potential gains from using violence. This form of state does not induce the powerful
to disarm or refrain from threatening violence, nor does it eliminate violence.  The internal
structure of relationships among members of the state – the state’s industrial organization if you
will –  is what constrains violence.  
Third, the balance of violence potential among the individual members of the state need
not be perfect; this is a game where even if the winner takes all, he is often worse off than if he13
4If the winner could be sure that no rival would emerge, he would be better off
vanquishing the other specialist, imposing peace, and reaping the gains.  The catch is that
another specialist in violence always arises.  The key is establishing a agreement between the
violence specialists where they remain armed, have a predominance of power so that no new
specialists in violence arise, and maintain their incentive-compatible agreement to maintain
order.
5Note that elites are simply defined as those who share power in the dominant coalition. 
In some societies elites are hereditary, but they need not be. 
doesn’t fight.
4  Instead, a modicum of peace arises, despite the fact that the threat of violence
continues to play a central and positive role in maintaining social order.  The balance that
enables social order to emerge is a balance that combines political, economic, and military
interests.
The exclusiveness of the specialist’s property rights is critical, since the glue holding the
agreements between the specialists together is the rents they earn from recognizing each other’s
special privileges.  If other violence specialists enter, they dissipate the rents, which means it is
no longer possible to sustain social order.
Once such an arrangement is in place, it is immediately in the interests of the
specialist/leaders to increase the productivity of the assets and people they control by
encouraging trade, specialization, and the division of labor.
5  Each leader, for example, might
grant the exclusive right to regulate trade across the group border to a trade specialist.  Since the
trader has the exclusive right to trade, he earns rents, and the rents he earns give him a strong
interest in maintaining the specialists/leaders in power.  The relationship is repeated, by
extension, to the formation of a set of elites who control all valuable economic, political,
religious, educational, and military functions within society. 14
Each member of the elite has exclusive or privileged control over specific resources or
activities.  Because of the limits on entry and access enforced by the coalition of elites, each elite
member earns rents from his privileges.  As a result, every member of the elite has an incentive
to support the current dominant coalition.  The rents therefore provide an incentive-compatible
commitment device among the elites to maintain their coalition.  The privileges enjoyed by the
elite extend farther than limits on entry.  Elites are able to form organizations whose internal and
external relationships can be enforced by the state.  Elite organizations enjoy tremendous
economic and political advantages in comparison with unorganized non-elites.  Recognizing and
supporting elite organizational forms, that is by providing the institutional framework within
which elites (and no one else) can form organizations, is one of the most valuable privilege that
elites possess.  We  expand on our notions about organizations in the next section.  Limited
access to organizational forms provides some of the largest rents holding the dominant coalition
together.
We call this form of blending political and economic relationships a natural state.  In a
natural state, politics and economics are intimately intertwined.  The state uses limited economic
entry to generate economic rents which are used to create credible commitments among elites to
support the current regime and provide order.  Because the political system manipulates the
economic system to produce and maintain order, it is meaningful to speak of economic and
political systems as existing separately, but it is not meaningful to think of them as independent. 
The political system is not exogenous to the economic system, since the political system is a
primary actor in the economy.  Similarly, the economic system is not exogenous to the political
system either, since the existence of economic rents structure political relationships.  15
6This produces what appears to be an extremely common, if not universal, feature of
natural states: patron/client networks.  For a review of this literature with an application to 17
th
century France see Kettering, Patrons, Brokers, and Clients.  For a modern, quantitative study of
the role of patronage networks in new democracies see Keefer, 2004, “Democratization and
Clientelism: Why are young democracies badly governed?” and Keefer and Vlaicu, 2005,
“Democracy, Credibility, and Clienelism.” 
We call this the natural state because we believe it is the natural response of human
societies to the threat of endemic violence.  The natural state first emerged historically about
10,000 years ago and remains the dominant form of human society today.
The natural state creates two major advantages in contrast with a primitive order, but
each comes with a caveat:
1) The natural state reduces violence, producing enormous social gains.  Every member
of the society is better off.  But there is a qualification: the natural state does not eliminate
violence.  The internal dynamics of the dominant coalition are based on continuous assessment
of the strength of individual members.  Part of what holds the natural state together is the threat
of violence by coalition members.  As conditions change, possible reconfigurations of the
coalition enabling a different group to control the social order are always a possibility.  Violence
and civil war are always potential outcomes.  Since the level of violence is reduced but not
eliminated, every individual within the elite must be conscious of the possibility of civil war and
align themselves into groups that contain potential protectors.
6  Most elite members are not
military specialists: they are traders, clergy, educators, governors, or politicians, but in a natural
state every member of the elite must be aligned with a military specialist in case civil war breaks
out.  A natural state that provides long-term stability can provide an environment of economic
growth, but there is always a caveat about the possibility of violence.16
2) The natural state has inherent incentives to promote specialization and division of
labor.  The natural state provides elites with the ability to extract surplus from the land, labor,
and capital they control.  Elites promote specialization and division of labor as long the rents
enjoyed by elites increase with social surplus.  The natural state possess an inherent balance,
however.  Some forms of expanding specialization require increasing the degree of entry,
openness, and access in the economic system. This, in turn, reduces rents, which may threaten
the stability of the entire social order. The natural state therefore involves a tradeoff: the gains
from greater specialization must be balanced against the threat of disorder.  This tradeoff is why
the natural state is a limited access social order.  Specialization and division of labor is good for
the dominant coalition, but only up to the point where specialization and division of labor erodes
the fundamental source of social stability and limits on violence.
Limited access orders have dominated human existence for the last 10,000 years. 
Clearly, natural states have widely divergent internal structures.  Some natural states in the
recent past have verged on anarchy – e.g., most recently Chad, Sudan, and Rwanda.  Others,
such as the Roman, Ottoman, and Chinese Empires, were stable for centuries and produced some
of the most sophisticated achievements of human history.  All of these societies are or were
natural states, however.  All limit economic, political, and social access to generate economic
rents and then use the rents to create credible commitments between elites to the existing social
order.  
The limited access order is a social equilibrium.  The equilibria share common
characteristics:
1) Control of violence through elite privileges.17
2) Limits on access to trade.
3) Relatively strong property right protection for elites and relatively weak property right
protection for non-elites.  To the extent a natural state is characterized by the rule
of law, it is for elites.
4) Restrictions on entry into and exit from economic, political, religious, educational, and
military organizations.
IV. Concepts
We have introduced terms and concepts whose meaning will not be transparent. The key
concepts are institutions, organizations, and social orders.  What is common across societies in a
given social order is not their culture or institutions, but the way the institutions structure and
support and support organizations and how they control violence.  We begin with the definition
of organizations and institutions, then consider social orders.
IV.1 Competition and Rents
Competition and rents are fundamental concepts in economic theory, and they are
features of human behavior present in primitive orders, limited access orders, and open access
orders.  When we say that the natural state provides social order by limiting entry, we do not
mean to imply in any way that the natural state is not competitive!  Indeed, it is the incredible
dangerous reality of political competition through military means that makes the limitation of
economic competition viable.  What differs across the various social orders is not the presence or18
7For a nuanced discussion of the many ways in which can be created see Khan and Jomo
(2000).
absence of rents and competition, but the nature of competition and the way in which rents are
created.
Rents accrue to the individual or organization that owns or controls an economic asset,
when the benefit received by that asset for performing any action exceed the opportunity cost of
performing the action.  Rents are ubiquitous.  
Rents can be created in many ways.
7  In a perfectly competitive market, infra-marginal
rents accrue to many consumers and producers.  For example, Schumpeterian (1942) creative
destruction implies that technological and institutional innovation frequently produce rents.  The
competition for rents drives competitive open access markets towards efficient outcomes. This
competition also erodes sources of rents created by Schumpeterian competition. In contrast,
limiting entry produces classic economic rents by reducing competition. With limited entry,
firms or individuals with market power receive rents. Rents can also be created by differential
access to organizational forms or resources.  For example, if only one firm in an industry has
access to the corporate form or special enforcement of its contracts in court, then even in a
competitive market that firm earns infra-marginal rents because of lower costs.  Deliberate rent-
creation by governments results from differential access for individuals or organizations to the
goods and services governments can provide, such as enforcement of property rights and
contracts, legal systems, resource endowments, public infrastructure, and defense and police
services.19
Rents exist in an open access order just as they do in a limited access order. What differs
is the way the political system manipulates the creation of rents in the economic system in order
to order the political system.  In an open access order, rents serve as an inducement to
Schumpeterian competition.  In a limited access order, rents exist because Schumpeterian
competition is inhibited or not allowed to function.
Like rents, competition is ubiquitous.  All human societies are competitive, although they
vary widely in the way they channel competition. When we say that open access orders use
competition to provide order, we are not implying an absence of competition in natural states.
We are saying instead that competition in a natural state involves different methods and produces
different outcomes than in open access orders.  Open access orders reduce or eliminate the use of
violence as a means of political and economic competition and, by doing so, open up the ability
to compete on other margins: price, quality, or votes for example.  
Violence is often a regular method of economic and political competition in natural
states.  The October 26, 2006 edition of the Economist included an article on “Bangladesh: Isn’t
Democracy Wonderful?” warning of the violence likely to result from upcoming elections and
the competition between the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the opposition party
Awarni League (AL): 
If the past is any guide, many people will be killed in mob violence and targeted
assassinations. The AL admits that it has distributed staves among its followers
for impending battles with BNP supporters. Bangladesh's politicians have been
buying up bullet-proof vests in recent weeks, according to Bangla Patrika, a
Bengali-language newspaper. Many observers fear the army may step in.
 
The Bangladesh situation is competitive, but its political competition cannot be characterized by
free entry and open access. 20
8Greif (2005) provides a more nuanced definition of institutions.
9The role of beliefs in institutions is tricky.  Formal laws, particularly ones that are
enforced, give everyone who knows about the laws common information about the world and
about the behavior of other individuals.  If a belief is widely shared within a population, even if
it not encoded in a law or observable in day to day behavior, the belief can nonetheless shape the
information that a group of people have about how other people will behave.  But not all beliefs
work this way.  So it is inaccurate to say that beliefs are institutions, but it is sometimes
appropriate to say that shared beliefs make up part of the institutional structure of a society.
Rents and competition interact with entry and access on many dimensions in every
society.  
IV.2 Institutions and Organizations
Institutions are the “rules of the game” (North 1990, p **).
8  Institutions are the patterns
of interaction that govern and constrain the relationships of individuals.  Defining the rules under
which people interact in any society is extremely difficult.  Institutions are hard to define
precisely because the rules that apply include written laws, formal social conventions, informal
norms of behavior, and shared beliefs about the world. We often think of institutions as
constraints on the behavior of individuals as individuals; for example, if the speed limit is 60
mph how fast should I drive?  But it seems equally clear and often more important for explaining
human behavior that institutions structure how individuals form beliefs and opinions about how
other people will behave: for example, if the speed limit is 60 mph how fast will other drivers
drive?  This complex of questions suggests why institutions span formal laws, informal norms of
behavior, and the shared beliefs that individuals hold about the world.
9  Individuals in a common
culture hold in common ideas about how other people will behave.  Cultures encompass ideas
about human behavior passed on to succeeding generations through education and experience. 21
All institutions, at the formal, social, or personal level, contain an important element of
abstraction: they are, in part, models about the world and the people around us. This argument
also implies that institutions are extremely difficult to pin down observationally.  Some
components of institutions are readily observable, such as formal rules, while other components
are almost impossible to observe, such as shared beliefs.
In contrast, organizations are concrete; they are made up of specific groups of individuals
pursuing a mix of common and individual goals through partially coordinated behavior. 
Organizations are flesh and blood entities.  Organizations act.  Because an organization
coordinates its members actions, an organization’s actions are more than the sum of the actions
of the individuals who make it up. Of fundamental importance to economists: organizations
make choices.
Institutions and organizations are easily confused.  Almost all human organizations have
an institutional structure.  As noted, institutions are models about how people around us will
behave.  A primary benefit of belonging to an organization is the ability to coordinate our actions
with the actions of other members of the organization. Coordination requires that individuals
share a set of models about how people behave.  Coordination within an organization requires
that members share a set of models about how they each will behave. Because the rules, norms,
and by-laws structure the relationships of an organization’s members, they constitute its
institutional structure.  In some organizations these structures are formal; in others, they are
informal.
A more accurate (and helpful) way to express this relationship is that most human
organizations have institutional structures.  We call those institutional structures organizational22
10Organizational forms are a subset of all the institutions in a society.  Not all institutions
are organizational forms and all organizations are made up of more than institutional forms.
11 The behavior of any human organization, however, is not determined solely by its
organizational form, because every organization is made up of real human beings, not
institutional abstractions.
12For ease of exposition we will generally refer to agreements as relationships between
individuals that are incentive-compatible and self-enforcing; and contracts as relationships
forms.
10  Organizational forms are the rules about how individuals within an organization are
supposed to interact and how the organization and its members are supposed to interact with
people outside of the organization.  These organizational forms can be formal, informal, or part
of the belief systems of the members.  The organizational form taken by any specific
organization is in part determined by the organizational forms supported by the wider society of
which it is a part (e.g. partnerships and corporations in the modern world) and by the interests of
the organization and its members.
11  We are particularly interested in the organizational forms
that the wider society supports since, as we will develop shortly, natural states effectively limit
access and create rents by limiting access to organizational forms.
We distinguish between two main types of organizations: adherent organizations and
contractual organizations.  The distinction between them is simple but profound.
Adherent organizations are characterized by self enforcing, incentive-compatible
agreements among their members. Adherent organizations do not rely on third parties to enforce
agreements among members.  Cooperation requires that, at every point in the existence of the
organization, it must be in the interests of all of the members to remain in the organization, or
those individuals cease to cooperate.
Contractual organizations, on the other hand, utilize third party enforcement of contracts
among their members.
12  Contractual organizations may also rely on incentive-compatible23
between individuals that may require third party enforcement.  By third party enforcement we
mean enforcement by an individual outside of the organization.
13There are a wealth of examples of both adherent and contractual organizations in the
industrial organization, game theory, and political economy literature.
14See the discussion in Barzel’s Theory of the State explaining how the state comes to
have a comparative advantage in third party enforcement of contracts. 
agreements among members in contractual organizations (as Williamson 1985 argues for the
firm). In contrast to adherent organizations, contractual organizations employ third party
enforcement for some arrangements so that members can pre-commit to a subset of arrangements
among themselves that may not, at every point of time, otherwise be incentive-compatible.
13
Thus, equity markets and their third-party enforceable contracts are an important component of
modern firms even if, per Williamson, much of the internal organizations of firms involves self-
enforcing contracts. 
The sovereignty of states implies that they are necessarily adherent organizations.  States
are always organizations, and the fundamental problem facing any would-be state is how to
structure internal agreements among members that are incentive-compatible and self-enforcing. 
Violence, as we have seen, can play a role in adherent organizations, since some incentive-
compatible arrangements involve the credible threat of violence by one or more members. 
Because of their nature, all states must include arrangements that deal with violence.  Natural
states are a way of matching violent individuals with economic rights to create incentives to
reduce the use of violence and to increase specialization and exchange.
Once a natural state has been created, violence specialists have a comparative advantage
in providing third party enforcement for a variety of organizational forms.
14  One of the most
valuable privileges a state can extend members of the elite is allowing them to form contractual24
15Social orders are not specific manifestations of particular political, economic, or other
institutions.  For example, neither “democracy” nor capitalism are social orders.  So, for
example, democracy is a political system, constitutional democracy a more specific political
system, parliamentary representative democracy an even more specific political system.  
organizations whose internal arrangements the state will enforce.  The state can effectively
exclude non-elites from participating in many activities simply by refusing to recognize non-elite
contractual organizations or to support non-elite contractual organizational forms.
The range of activities that can be undertaken by an organization depends in part on its
internal structure.  Modern, developed societies are literally brimming with contractual
organizations.  The wide range of contractual organizational forms  supported by an open access
social order is the key to its success as a political and economic system.  
The central importance of contractual organizations raises a fundamental question about
the structure of the state: who will act as a third party, and what will be its biases?  Every society
with contractual organizations must have an organization that provides third party enforcement
(whether it uses coercion or not).  That organization has to be formed from purely incentive-
compatible agreements among its members.  That organization, of course, is what we call the
state.
IV.3 Social Orders
Social order encompass the political, economic, cultural, religious, military, and
educational systems.
15  A social order determines the characteristic organizational pattern of its
constituent systems.  Specifically, the social orders are distinguished by their ability to create
and maintain contractual organizations.  The typology of three social orders sets out five25
16Anthropologists have long tried to identify “great divide” where states first appear, and
we believe that this divide marks the transition from primitive orders to limited access orders.
The anthropologist’s difficulties are evidence of how messy the transition is.  Bands, tribes,
chiefdoms, kingdoms, and states are all arrayed along the transition path.  
intellectual tasks: models of the three social orders, a model of the transition from primitive
orders to limited access orders, and a model of the transition from limited access orders to open
access orders.  In our larger project, the transition from limited to open access social orders is
clearly the most challenging and rewarding process to understand.  But first, we need to
understand where that transition begins. 
IV.4 Some observations about these concepts. 
With concepts this general, it may be useful to be specific about what we are not saying. 
First, no teleology is implied by the progression from primitive to limited access to open access
orders. Nothing is automatic about either transition. Three hundred years ago, when the first
open access orders emerged, significant parts of the world still lived in primitive orders. The rise
and fall of civilizations, large and small, suggests that progress is not linear, and regressions can
occur.  The twentieth century witnessed several limited access orders verge for a time on a
breakdown into violent anarchy (e.g. Rwanda, Bosnia, Cambodia, and the Sudan) and some on
the verge of, or in the process of, transiting from natural states to open access orders (Taiwan
and South Korea spring to mind).
Second, the clean break in the conceptual framework between the three orders is not
matched by a neatly observable clean break in the historical record.  Primitive social orders do
not just wake up one day to become limited access orders.
16  Nor do limited access orders26
suddenly become open access orders in a day, a month, or a year.  Nevertheless, it does appear
that transitions occur in a period of time that are quite short by historical standards, something on
the order of fifty years or less.  In the twentieth century Taiwan, South Korea, Ireland, and Spain
appear to have made very rapid transitions.  In the late eighteenth and early 19th century, Britain,
France, the Dutch, and the United States made transitions that took roughly fifty years.
Third, it does not seem that societies are laid out historically in a gradual continuum of
social orders.  Substantial and significant changes occur in societies that become developed. 
Moreover, a “missing middle” exists between developed and non-developing societies.  The
cross country growth literature finds over and over again that rich countries exhibit convergence,
but poor countries are not converging to rich countries.  We believe that this reflects the
existence of just three social orders, no more, no less.  Primitive orders are demonstrably and
discontinuously different from limited access orders.  Limited access orders are demonstrably
and discontinuously different from open access orders.  
We interpret the strong and persistent difference in social structures and economic
outcomes in the developed and non-developed worlds as clear evidence of the discontinuity.  But
the discontinuity is structural, not temporal, in the sense that societies making the transition from
limited to open access must, necessarily, make a transition over a period of historical time. 
Transiting from one order to another (in either direction) is not easy and it does not happen
frequently in history.  We consider question of continuity in historical processes and
discontinuity in social orders in the section dealing with the transition process.
Fourth, a wide range of specific political, economic, military, religious, educational, and
other systems are possible within a given social order.  For example, a natural state may exhibit a27
large number of possible coalition structures, and with them associated limits on economic entry,
that sustain a viable dominant coalition.  Dictatorships, strong men, juntas, aristocracies,
monarchies (hereditary and not), single party regimes, and representative assemblies (of the
elites not the masses) all seem to represent viable internal structures for a natural state in some
historical circumstances.  Historically, natural states are vulnerable to internal revolutions,
particularly palace coups, that change the faces of the leading elements in the dominant coalition
without changing the nature of the social order.  In terms of institutions, the natural state’s lack
of stability implies that most individual natural states will exhibit a wide variety of actual
institutions. 
Critically important, the same institution will operate differently in an open access order
than in a limited access order.  This difference poses a challenge to empirical investigations into
the effect of institutions on economic performance.  Since institutions are made up of rules,
behavior patterns, and shared beliefs, the same observable rules may have very different
outcomes if the behavior and beliefs associated with them are different.  Elections, for example,
work differently in a natural state than in an open access order.  The ability of reputation to
enforce agreements between individuals works differently if there is competitive free entry, than
if there is limited entry.  As we discuss in the section on the transition, the fact that the same
institution may work differently in a limited and open access social order provides a fundamental
insight into the transition process.
Finally, social orders are stable, but not static.  This is a difficult point to grasp.  As
social scientists we often associate change with movement and progress (living in developing
open access societies as we do).  But a great deal of change in history is simply change.  In every28
society the balance among political, economic, religious, military, and educational organizations
is in continual flux.  Individuals, groups, and organizations are always contending for power,
resources, status, and other rewards.  What appears to be stable, across time in individual
societies, is the pattern of interaction with respect to access to organizational forms in the
individual spheres of social activity.
V. Limited Access Orders
The next two sections briefly lay out the main aspects of limited access orders and open access
orders, followed by a rough sketch of how societies historically have made the transition from
one to the other.  A brief mention is made of primitive orders and the first transition, but we
focus on the last 500 years, not the last 50,000.
V.1 Limited Access Orders and the Natural State:
A primitive society is made up of many small social units, with very little specialization
and division of labor. This social order also experiences a high level of violence.  The creation of
larger social units enables a greater level of specialization and division of labor, but greater
specialization creates two problems: the emergence of specialists in violence and the need to
coordinate social interaction within and among larger groups.  The natural state is the specific
mechanism by which both problems are solved. Historically, the natural state stretches from
10,000 years ago to the present day. 29
17One can think of Greek City states around 1,000 BCE, Europe in the 10th century, or
Afghanistan in the 1990s as examples of regions with many, highly fragmented, social units.
18This, of course, does not preclude factions within the elites from scheming to overthrow
the current coalition, or continuous contention within the coalition over the distribution of rights
and rents.
How can a society with large numbers of small social units, each with some internal
specialization and division of labor, including specialists in violence, reach an agreement that
enables the creation of a stable larger political unit (however organized) as well as an increase in
exchange?
17  The fundamental problem is creating incentive-compatible arrangements between
powerful groups – where power is military, economic, or religious – that bind the interest of the
groups to the continued existence of the state. 
We have already described how the natural state solve these problems by creating and
maintaining privileged rights to valuable resources, such as land, or valuable social interactions,
such as trade or worship.  We define individuals or groups who possess these rights as elites. The
recognition of elite privileges creates rents to land, trade, and worship. In turn, the rents are more
valuable the more stable and peaceful the society and the greater the degree of specialization and
division of labor.  The rents bind the interests of elites to the current dominant coalition.  Any
threat to the existing coalition threatens the rents of all elites, because a breakdown in social
order reduces everyone’s rents.
18  The existence of rents also creates incentives, at the margin,
for policies that increase stability and trade.  In combination, this form of state creates social
stability that prevents disorder by creating a set of self-enforcing agreements among elites that
simultaneously create political and economic relationships within the state. 
All natural states, therefore, face an ongoing dilemma of how big to make the dominant
coalition.  Increasing the size of the coalition gives it more power, but dilutes the rents that hold30
19 To model the natural state, we draw on the theory in Greif, Milgrom and Weingast
(1994). We assume that increasing the size of the coalition increases the probability the state will
survive, but at a declining rate: the marginal value of an additional individual’s support declines
as the size of the coalition rises.  Expanding the coalition has three separate effects. First and
most obvious, a larger coalition increases the probability of survival; second, it dissipates the
rents across a wider group, lowering the average value of the coalition to its members; and third,
the declining marginal value of support means that increasing the coalition lowers the costs to
the state of defection.  The natural state trades off the benefits of expanding the support coalition
which increases the probability that the coalition survives against the costs of dissipating the
rents and lowering the costs that coalition members can impose on it in the event that the state
fails to honor its agreement. Too large a coalition implies that the rents are insufficient to bind
particular groups to the coalition, and hence they will defect. 
20Over the last two hundred years, the rise of open access orders in the western world 
resulted in the rise of nation states with well defined boundaries (an issue discussed in the next
it together.
19  A credible balance among interests must therefore exist within the groups that
make up the dominant coalition. Elites support and maintain the state. They enforce their rights
in part by threatening to withdraw from the coalition if their rights are violated. Because the state
needs to maintain sufficient support to survive, the threat of elite withdrawal is a credible
potential threat forces the state to honor its part of the agreements to elites. Credibility, therefore,
necessarily limits how large the coalition can be. If the coalition becomes to large, it dilutes the
ability of elites to threaten the natural state (and its support coalition) by withdrawal of support. 
External competitors may potentially be integrated into a natural state’s coalition.
Boundaries of natural states are often fluid, since the possibility of incorporating an additional
geographic unit into the dominant coalition is possible, as is the possibility that the existing
coalition will break down into smaller units.  As a result, the distinction between internal and
external relations is often blurred in a natural state. Only with the rise of nation states over the
last 300 years have well defined boundaries emerged throughout the world (an issue we return to
below) and created a much sharper distinction between domestic and international security.
2031
section).  The expansion of European power to the rest of the world in the 19
th and 20
th century
produced a world defined by boundaries.  Those boundaries persisted even after the end of
colonial rule (see Tilly, Coercion and Capital.)  Well defined national boundaries were not a
feature of most states before 1700.
The distinction between the stability of a social order and the changing nature of political
and economic systems should now be clearer.  A limited access order is characterized by the
creation of privileged access to valuable rights and activities.  Those privileges are enforced by
the political and military elites within the state and enjoyed by elite members of the dominant
coalition.  That aspect of the social structure typically does not change over time (at least from
the emergence of larger social units 5,000 to 10,000 years ago up to the emergence of open
access orders 300 years ago).  The specific members of the dominant coalition, the particular
rights and privileges created and enforced by the natural state, and the identity of the major
players, however, are subject to episodic adjustment. In this sense, social orders are stable, but
not static.  The kaleidoscope of recorded history is largely a record of the shifting patterns of
coalitions and systems within the framework of the limited access order and across the fluid
geographic boundaries of the natural state.  
The theory of the double balance identifies the interactive nature of the constituent
systems in a social order.  First, each system must have its own internal balance.  In the natural
state, there must be a political balance of military power and political power within the dominant
coalition.  Similarly there must be a balance (equilibrium) within the economic system.  Second,
the relationship among the systems must be balanced, hence the double balance.  In the natural
state, the distribution of economic assets must conform to and support the distribution of
political power.  In any specific society, the actual distribution of economic rents and political32
control must be closely related.  In general, a limited access political system will be incapable of
supporting an open access economic system: political control over entry inevitably undermines
economic competition.  Likewise, a limited access economic system is incapable of sustaining an
open access political system: concentration of economic rents enable elite groups to undermine
political competition.
The balance of limited access orders builds on inherent affinity in human nature for
building personal relationships.  Natural states are hierarchies of personal relationships.  Elites
hold power by virtue of their personal position in the dominant coalition.  Rights are never
impersonal in a natural state, they are always subject to revision (no matter how they are stated
legally, if such a concept even exists in that state). 
By extending the range of feasible personal relationships, the limited access order
possess several major advantages over a primitive order.  The first is that limited access orders
provide the framework for the emergence of institutions that provide well defined property
rights, if only for elites.  The fundamental cohesion of the natural state arises because elites
recognize each other’s rights to the possession of valuable resources and activities.  The mutual
recognition of rights is credible because of the underlying gains from the natural state. Extending
the hierarchy of relations that make up the natural state can produce more specialization and
division of labor, subject to the condition such an expansion not dissipate rents.  Regularizing
relationships among elites may also produce more trade and a greater surplus.  This leads to a
prediction:
The origin of property rights and legal systems is the definition of elite rights.33
21There is a great deal of evidence that the primary activity of chieftans in nascent states
identified in the political anthropology literature is control of trade.  See Claessen and Skalnick
(1978).
The second major benefit of the natural state is the incentives it creates for the promotion
of trade within and among groups and the associated increase in specialization and division of
labor.  The right to trade is a privilege defined by the dominant coalition, leading to another
prediction:
All natural states control trade among states.
21
The third major benefit of the natural state is the support it provides for organizations. 
Perhaps the most valuable right possessed by elites is the ability to form contractual
organizations whose internal and external relations can be contractually enforced by a third
party.  The ability to create and support contractual organizations vastly increases the
productivity of individuals in a limited access order as compared to a primitive order.  The right
to create organizations, however, is limited to elites, it is not available to everyone, leading to
another prediction:
All natural states limit access to organizational forms.
Limiting access to organizational forms is both the key to understanding why the natural
state works as a social order and is able to support so much economic development over the last
10,000 years.  By supporting larger and more complex organizations, the natural state is able to
raise productivity directly and capture gains from specialization and division of labor. 
Conversely, limited access is also the key to understanding why the natural state impedes
modern economic growth. The limitation of economic exchange to personal relationships places
major limits on the productivity and performance of a limited access economy.34
22The De Soto cases have been extended in a series of studies carried out by the Coase
Institute, as well as extensive studies done by the World Bank.
The limitations of natural states leap out when we compare them to open access orders.
First, despite the limited access order’s ability to promote trade, the necessity of creating rents to
promote stability produces an inherent tendency for natural states to create market power and
restrict competition.  The difficulty in starting a t-shirt factory in Peru, documented by De Soto,
is a classic example of how the natural state not only refuses to support the creation of organized
economic activity but actively discourages it for non-elites.
22  The “crony capitalism” common in
today’s developing world (Campos and Root 1996) represents another manifestation of the
natural state’s inherent tendency to limit access to organizational forms to members of the
dominant elite. 
Second, natural states face impediments to making the credible commitments necessary
to protect the rights of non-elites. Non-elites cannot credibly threaten the state or coalition,
because a natural state’s survival does not depend on the support of non-elites. Independent of
what the laws or constitution of a natural state say, non-elites cannot credibly accept promises by
the state to protect their rights.  Non-elites therefore make significantly smaller investments in
physical and human capital than they would if their rights could be credibly guaranteed.  This
too limits growth in natural states. 
Non-elites also employ what James Scott calls “the weapons of the weak” in order to
protect what property and assets they do have.  The rational peasant (non-elite) behaves in
systematic ways to make it more difficult for the lord (elite) to determine whether the peasant is
working hard and using resources effectively.  Foot dragging, malingering, dissimulation are the35
23The problem is even worse.  A primary way to limit access indirectly is by raising
transaction costs, so both elites and non-elites engage in behavior that deliberately raises
transaction costs.
24See James Scott (1987), Alston and Ferrie (1985) on the American South, and Sharon
Kettering (1986) on 18
th century France.
order of the day.  As a result, not only are property rights poorly defined conceptually, elites
deliberately raise transaction costs.
23  
Within the logic of the natural state, patronage networks develop as a characteristic form
of extending a modicum of protection to non-elites.  Scott shows how a social system works
where elite patrons are able exploit their privileged position by providing protection to their
clients.  Patronage networks are a common form of social organization in today’s developing
world, as well as the nineteenth and early twentieth century American South and seventeenth and
eighteenth century France.
24
The third and most debilitating weakness of natural states is that limited access prevents
market prices from allocating resources between competing uses.  Figure 1 gives the typical
market power diagram, with constant marginal cost.  The neo-classical analysis predicts that the
monopolist will charge PM , but that conclusion depends on unconstrained profit maximization
by the monopolist.  In a natural state, valuable privileges are used to hold the political economy
system together.  Rather than capturing rents by charging a high price, the possessor of a
privilege may exploit it by charging a low price and allocating the resource to political allies. 
The seller in this market may charge any price between PM and PB.  For example, in many non-
developed countries, public water is provided at prices below cost.  In return for access to water,
individuals must deliver politically valuable votes or support.36
25This corresponds closely to Shleifer and Vishny’s ideas about different forms of
corruption.
It seems counterintuitive, but a limited access order where all elites charged the
monopoly price in all markets would be a far more efficient and productive society than one in
which elites do not charge market clearing prices, but instead allocate goods and services at
prices reflecting political advantage.
25  When elites charge less than market clearing prices to
secure political ends, the result is that prices cannot be used for impersonal coordination of the
behavior of individuals. Natural states thus cripple the price mechanism as a means to convey
information about marginal benefits, marginal costs, and scarcity.
Neo-classical economists believe that prices always work to allocate resources and have
done so throughout all of human history.  Our perspective suggests that it is not surprising that
modern economic analysis of the price mechanism did not develop until open access orders with
competitive markets began to develop.  Competitive use of resources have existed since the
dawn of human existence, but, with a few notable exceptions (such as ancient Greece),
competitive markets with prices that convey information capable of coordinating human action
are a recent development.
VI. The Logic of Open Access
Where limited access orders use rent-creation to provide social order, open access orders use
competition.  Although all natural states limit competition in order to create rents, they cannot37
26See Przeworksi, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi, 2000 for an in depth study of
democracy and development.  Keefer and Vlaicu also analyze why new democracies so often
fail.
suppress all competition.  Similarly, all open access societies possess some rent-seeking and
rent-creation. 
Economic theory explains how competitive markets work, how market competition
produces welfare enhancing outcomes, and how the price mechanism serves as an impersonal
means of coordinating individual behavior.  But neo-classical economic theory makes a set of
extreme and implicit assumptions about the nature of politics and the state: competition is
sustained, entry is open, property rights exist and are enforced, violence is not used to allocate
resources, and (embedded in the zero transaction cost assumption) a ordered society already
exists.  All of these assumptions place significant restrictions on the nature of the state in ways
that are difficult to assess as long as the assumptions remain implicit. This means that, per the
theory of the double balance, open economic access assumed by neo-classical economic theory
cannot be sustained without a corresponding open access on the political side that supports a
stable system of private property rights and the rule of law. 
Just as neoclassical economics take the state, property rights, and open entry and property
rights as given, political science studies of elections and policy choice in open access societies
assume stable democracy, open access to political competition, and free expression of opinion.
These models all fail to explain how open access is sustained.
The empirical political science literature, going back at least to Lipset, suggests a strong
correlation between democracy and thriving economic markets and economies.  But the direction
of causation is unclear.  New democracies in very poor countries are unlikely to succeed.
26  And38
all very rich societies are democracies.  Our framework suggests that economic and political
institutions are so deeply enmeshed that identifying a causal relation is unlikely to yield a deeper
understanding of the processes involved in sustaining a social order.  We argue that political and
economic competition help sustain one another.
The central question in an open access theory of politics is explaining how both political
and economic competition are maintained. Political officials face natural pressures to create
privilege and provide benefits, and many studies emphasize this rent-seeking aspect of politics
(e.g., Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock 1980). What prevents these forces from transforming an
open access order into a natural state? how is open access to organizations of all types sustained?
Calling on the good offices of a constitution does not provide us with an explanation. We
then have to explain how the constitutional order is sustained, a question we turn to below.
Political competition in an open access order requires, indeed it demands, the presence of many
large, sophisticated, well organized interests that can effectively compete with one another
through whatever political institutions exist.
Neo-classical economic theory, when extended to include organizations (firms), provides
a compelling logic of how powerful and sophisticated interests coexist in a competitive
equilibrium.  Firms do not peacefully coexist.  Ford, GM, Toyota, Nissan, Mercedes, and BMW
engage in constant competition, but are typically incapable of wiping each other out over the
short run.  The dynamics of a competitive market ensure that, absent either government
intervention on behalf of one competitor or economies of scale in production, markets with open
access will remain open and competitive.  Further, as Schumpeter emphasizes, over the long run
competition consists less of competition on price than competition on new innovations and39
products. Over the long run, the process of creative destruction does eliminate rival firms on
entire industries.  Creative destruction depends critically on open entry and support for
organizational forms.  The ability of entrepreneurs to perceive new opportunities to capture rents
and to form organizations to capture those benefits.  Critically, markets with open entry will
generate economic interests within firms (and other economic actors as well) that are extremely
sensitive to changes in government policies. 
The main point is that market organizations have vested interests in maintaining the
system that supports the protection for property rights, enforcement of contracts, and the rule of
law. At the margin, politics does intervene in markets for political ends, but the fundamental
characteristic of open access societies is that open access survives, in many cases (as in the
United States and Western Europe), for many generations.
Let us summarize this point as a prediction of the theory:
Sustaining competitive democracy is possible only in the presence of economic
competition and the emergence of sophisticated economic organizations.
An important distinction between politics and economics is how they relate to the
margin. Economic theory emphasizes that competition occurs at the margin.  Successful
economic competition results in greater profits and rents, but elimination of rivals occurs
marginally, not totally.  In contrast, positive political theory emphasizes that the political process
selects a single winner from among a set of typically distinct competitors. Political theory and
political life is decidedly non-marginal: it is potentially winner-take-all. When a new party takes
over from another, policies often change dramatically, non-marginally, and across the board.
How does a modern open access order prevent a political winner from expropriating the
property of the political losers?  How, to paraphrase Przeworksi (1991), are political losers40
27In a modern open access society “access to organizational forms” is often understood as
an individual right.
28This does not mean that any society where the state possesses a monopoly of legitimate
force is an open access order.  A monopoly on violence is necessary for an open access order,
not sufficient. Although most natural states attempt to monopolize the use of violence by
including the most powerfully violent members of society in the dominant coalition; most fail.
Open access orders successfully prohibit legitimate organizations from competing with one
another through the use of violence and coercion.
29The rules about legitimate use of power must be clear, typically through constitutional
“bright lines” that make it clear when those in power have violated the rule.
convinced that it is in their interests to concede power today and that they will live to fight
another day?  Our answer has three basic pieces:
Piece I:  An open access order is characterized by open access to organizational forms,
specifically to contractual organizational forms, that are open to all individuals who meet
impersonal requirements.
27  Political and economic institutions allow everyone access to specific
contractual and organizations forms. A vast array of organizations form to provide club-like
public goods to their members. 
Piece II: As Weber defines the state (1947, 156), in all open access orders the state
possesses a monopoly on legitimate violence. The monopoly involves two dimensions.  First, the
state does not support private organizational forms for organizations that use violence.  Second,
the open access state suppresses alternative sources of violence.  Open access orders that fail the
second task typically fail to remain open access orders.
28 
Piece III: Because the state holds monopoly control of violence, rules about when and
why the state can use legitimate violence must be clearly specified and well understood.  Further,
the illegitimate use of violence by the state can be identified and policed by sanctions against
members of the government.
2941
The ability to impose sanctions on the government requires well specified, well
understood, and non-violent mechanisms that enable rival groups and organization to: (a)
compete for control of the state; (b) protect their rights against encroachments by both the state
and other private groups; (c) to resolve disputes among groups; and (d) that these mechanisms
work.
Maintaining open access, therefore, requires ensuring that the constitutional rules noted
in Piece III are enforced.  Many limited access orders in the world today have constitutional
rules and laws that limit illegitimate violence by the state and provide secure rights and dispute
resolution for private citizens, but the government fails to honor the rules and laws. How does it
work in an open access order?
As Weingast (2006) analyzes, the possibility of winner-take-all outcomes in political
contests implies that all successful political constitutions limit the stakes of power.  That is,
political competition in an open access order is usually over control of relatively small pieces of
the state and its functions.  Everything is not up for grabs in any specific election.  A system of
constitutional government is described in terms of both individual rights and various structure
and processes of government that constrain governmental policymaking.  But individual rights
are only protected if the mechanisms of government articulated in the constitutional structure –
the checks and balances and multiple veto points of a functional open access constitution – are
backed by incentive-compatible commitments on the part of relevant groups in society to act to
protect those rights.
Rights and constitutional structures are enforced through a range of mechanisms, some
general and some specific. The most general mechanism is the consensus condition (Weingast42
1997, 2006). The idea is that when citizens have the ability to react in concert to constitutional
transgressions, they can threaten those in power who seek to violate the rules. Incumbents need
support to survive, and a coordinated reaction that withdraws support from rulers threatens their
survival. Constitutions of open access orders create focal solutions to these coordination
problems that help citizens react in concert.
But citizens cannot coordinate their reactions on their own, they require the help of
intermediaries – organizations. If the government violates a well understood constitution rule,
then open access political constitutions rely on the coordinated action of constituted authorities
and citizens to detect and punish violations of the rule.  Punishment mechanisms will not be self-
enforcing, however, if only members of the government can impose penalties for the violations
of the constitutional rules (as is the case in a natural state).  The public at large must also be
capable of detecting and punishing unconstitutional behavior.  This punishment is unlikely to
arise through the uncoordinated actions of individuals acting as individuals, the costs of
coordinating collective action are too high.  Citizens, somehow, need to coordinate their
coordination. 
This is where Piece I comes in.  Open access makes this all work. Open access societies
are filled with a wide range of well organized groups. These organizations may form for any
number of reasons, but whatever the reason, the existence of well organized groups provides
numerous focal points for the where the concentrated effects of a government action can be
evaluated and contested.  Governmental actions that adversely affect a large number individuals43
30This is not to say that large numbers of individuals in an open access society cannot be
repressed or exploited, obviously they can.  But it is very difficult to systematically repress or
exploit individuals who have the right to form contractual organizations and use those
organizations to contest for political or economic power.
31Not every citizen needs to pay attention to what the government is doing all the time. 
The creation of focal points in constitutions, and both political and economic organizations,
enable a society to effectively monitor the behavior of the state at relatively low cost.
also show up on the radar of many organizations.
30  These organizations have already overcome
the free rider problem through their ability to access third party enforcement of internal
agreements.  Some of the organizations affected may be political, some economic, and others
may be purely social.  But they can all respond in a coordinated manner.  Any organization,
whatever its original purpose, can be readily adapted to serve the political interests of its
members when necessary.  Indeed, this threat of political action by organizations is a major
reason most natural states suppress them.  An open access society with large numbers of
competitive contractual organizations is therefore much better equipped to enforce a political
constitution.
31  This is the logic of open access.
Political scientists have long recognized the importance of a well developed civil society
– that is, a society rich in organizations – for maintaining democracy (O’Donnell and Schmitter
1986).  The existence of well organized economic interests strengthens the credible commitment
of, for example, a democratically elected majority not to exploit the interests of the minority. 
Likewise, the existence of well organized political organizations operating in a competitive
political environment strengthens the credible commitment of the state to allow open access to
most forms of economic activity.  
A range of more specific mechanisms also help prevent an open access order from
retrogressing into a natural state through the imposition of privilege, exclusion, and rent-44
creation. We have already seen how competitive markets help coordinate reactions against
governmental transgressions. In addition, mobile factors of production and the government’s
fiscal interests work against systematic encroachments on the rule of law, property rights, and
the market more generally. Mobile factors of production, particularly capital and labor, tend to
move from jurisdictions that provide less hospitable environments to those providing more. In a
global economy, this means that countries experiencing significant increases in levels of rent-
seeking and compromises of the rule of law tend to lose capital, including human capital.
Similarly, most open access orders rely on broad taxes to finance governmental programs and
public goods, typically income taxes or value added taxes. Broad based economic taxes imply
that the government’s revenue is correlated with the health of the market. Increasingly high
levels of privilege and rent-seeking shrink the economy, and with it, tax revenue.
In combination, mobile factors of production and fiscal interests imply that, no matter
what an incumbent government’s goals, significant attempts at rent-creation by  the government
will shrink both the economy and tax revenue. This shrinkage implies a feedback mechanism:
people are out of work; and shrinking tax revenue implies that the government cannot sustain a
constant level of political benefits. Both make survival for incumbents problematic.
Finally, elections provide a fundamental check on transgressions by providing the
opposition with incentives to champion the cause of those whose interests and rights the
government seeks to transgress. Open access to organizations of all kinds provides a means of
coordinating citizens, groups and firms, and opposition parties to contest potential
transgressions.45
Implications 
As with the natural state, a close connection exists within open access orders between the
institutional structure of the political and economic systems. A double balance of institutions and
organizations characterizes all open access orders.  In this way, political competition strengthens
economic competition and economic competition strengthens political competition. Open access
in economics implies a vibrant set of organizations to react to constitutional violations. Open
access in politics also helps police the government and sustain the basic institutions necessary to
maintain competitive markets, such as secure property rights and the rule of law. 
The presence of competition within open access orders fosters impersonal exchange and
enables the price mechanism to function.  Functioning markets bring a multitude of benefits.  In
contrast to natural states, prices reflect scarcity.  Resources are therefore able to move to their
highest valued use and because prices reflect marginal costs and marginal benefits, resources can
actually seek out and determine their highest valued use.  
Not only do prices impersonally coordinate market exchange, changes in prices
immediately signal the effects of government policies.  A key way to limit the stakes of power at
issue in political competition is to specifying a range of rights, including economic rights, that
the government must not transgression. Part of making commitments to these rights credible is
the price mechanism, which quickly conveys information to interested parties, and the existence
of organizations who respond to the information.  Economic rights combine with open access to
foster the investment necessary for thriving markets. 
Historians have long emphasized that a major aspect of long-term economic growth is the
emergence of impersonal exchange (North 1981, Greif 2005). Truly competitive markets police46
a wide range of cheating and opportunistic behavior.  Individuals who trust that they will not be
cheated at the grocery store invest far fewer resources to measuring, monitoring, and transacting
in general.  Put another way, impersonal exchange economies have low transaction costs. 
Because they are not restricted to trading with merchants with whom they deal with repeatedly,
the number of trades they engage in are larger than in a limited access order.  Transaction costs
throughout the system fall, and markets in general are not only supported, they operate more
efficiently.
A final question to consider is why the same mechanisms that sustain an open access
order do not have the same effect in a natural state. After all, natural states have markets, mobile
factors of production, fiscal interests, and, often, elections and even a degree of the consensus
condition. The answer is open access and competition: All these mechanisms work differently in
the presence of open access and competition. Natural states limit access and exclude
competitors. They make it difficult to form organizations, so they limit the range of
organizations that help citizens coordinate against the government. Indeed, preventing this
coordination is one reason why most natural states restrict access to organizations. Moreover, a
natural state’s greater control of the economy for rent-seeking purposes inhibits market
mechanisms. Mobile factors of production, for example, have far less effect in countries that
actively restrict out-migration of labor and capital. Control of markets also means that market
prices work far less efficiently at signaling the effects of government actions. And in those
natural states with elections, restrictions on organizations, free speech, and electoral competition
reduce the efficacy of elections. Finally, natural states do not satisfy the consensus condition to
the same degree. In combination with restrictions on organizations, limits on the consensus47
condition imply that citizens in natural states have a much more limited ability to coordinate
against the state in the face of constitutional transgressions. 
To summarize, the theory of double balance suggests why the political and economic
systems operate in parallel: it is an equilibrium. The arguments in the natural state section
showed why limits on political and economic access go hand-in-hand. The natural state cannot
survive otherwise. The force of this section is the parallel argument about open access orders:
these require competition and open access in both politics and economics. 
VII. Explaining the Transition from Limited Access Orders to Open Access Orders 
We have laid out three social orders.  How do countries move from one stable social order to
another?  In particular, how does the transition from a limited access order to an open access
order take place?  
To understanding the transition, we observe that each order is characterized by the type
of organizations it supports.  A primitive order cannot support contractual organizations, so
organizations – to the extent that they exist at all – must be adherent organizations.  Limited
access orders support the creation of adherent and contractual organizations, but it places
significant limits on the number and type of contractual organizations that can be formed. Open
access orders support a wide variety of adherent and contractual organizations. Open access to
organizations creates political and economic competition, makes possible thriving markets, and
enables self-sustaining modern economic growth.  To understand the transition from limited to
open access societies we must understand the processes of institutional change that allows
sustained open access to organizational forms.48
32McIlwain’s Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern is a classic and edifying example of
how the concept of “popular consent” can be traced from the Greeks, through the Romans, the
canonists, the medievalists, and the British, up to modern times.  Berman’s Law and Revolution
does the same for the idea of the rule of law.  Gierke’s Politics in the Middle Ages follows the
development of corporate forms.  Kantorowicz’s The Kings Two Bodies, investigates how the
idea of a corporate and impersonal state evolved in Europe.  In economic history Jones The
European Miracle, builds his case for why Europe develops on the fragmentation of, and
subsequent competition between, political units.  Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations,
focuses on culture as a the critical determinant of why some societies develop and others do not. 
Rosenberg and Birdzell, Why the West Grew Rich, focus on a combination of technology and
organization.  Examples of this type of historical analysis, while finite, appear to be
innumberable.
The focus on organizations differs from than the traditional social science investigations
into the origins of modern development.  Usually some aspect of modern society – such as
impersonal exchange, capital accumulation, competitive markets, democracy, rule of law, high
income, geography, disease environment, or a heightened concept of self and individual rights –
is posited to be the critical aspect of all developed societies. The social scientist then traces the
emergence of that aspect through the historical record to see if the presence or emergence of that
trait is connected with modern development.
32 
Rather than characterizing modern development as a series of outcomes, we characterize
it as a process embedded in a particular social order, an open access order.  Our conceptual
framework identifies the social processes that sustain impersonal exchange, competitive markets,
and competitive democracy. For insights into those processes, we must look to the interaction of
institutions and organizations, specifically to the institutional supports and constraints on the
type of organizations that can form and then provide access to those organizational forms.  
Our approach has three steps. The first step identifies specific institutions consistent with
the logic of the natural state that, nonetheless, generate support for impersonal exchange among49
33The presence of elections Mexico for most of the 20
th century did not mean that those
elections were competitive, see Haber, et al.  But the presence of elections as an institutional rule
has made it easier for the Mexicans to move toward competitive elections over the two last
decades.  They did not simultaneously have to invent the institution of elections and open access
to political organizational forms, just the latter.
elites.  These institutions begin the transition and place a natural state on what we call the
doorstep.
The second step identifies the forces that sustain the movement of a limited access order
on the doorstep toward open access. A central feature of natural states is that the size of the
dominant coalition is self-limiting.  Natural states generate equilibrating forces that tend to limit
access.  To explain how the dominant coalition expands access, we must identify how the natural
state’s self-limiting forces are overcome.
The third step in our argument begins with an often overlooked observation that deserves
special emphasis: the same institution or mechanism may produce different outcomes in different
circumstances. In particular, many institutions and mechanisms work differently depending on
whether the institution is embedded in a limited access order or an open access order. 
Institutions are made up of rules, behavior patterns, and beliefs.  For example, a rule, such as
electing a leader by majority vote of the qualified electorate, produces different results in the
presence of open entry and political competition than in the presence of limited access.
An important implication of this observation is that it is more difficult to create and
sustain an institution if new rules and behavior patterns have to be invented from whole cloth
than if a set of existing rules and behavior patterns can be adapted to the form the new institution
(Greif 2005). For example, it is generally easier to implement competitive elections in a society
that already allows elections, even if the original elections are not competitive.
33  Similarly, it is50
easier to create open access to perpetually lived corporations in a society that already sustains
limited access to such corporations. The point applies to all institutions.  The third step points
toward identifying how the development of institutions of the natural state can be adapted to
open access with a minimum amount of institutional change.  Understanding the transition
requires explaining how small increases in access in a natural state can somehow grow into a full
blown transition.  
Any explanation of the transition process must start with a natural state. Beginning with a
natural state, however, imposes three specific logic requirements on our explanation.  Any
explanation of the transition must meet the following criteria:
LC 1) The institutions, organizations, and behavior of individuals in place at the
beginning of the transition must be consistent with behavior in the natural state. 
LC 2) The changes in institutions, organizations, and behavior that occur during  the
transition must be explained as intentional acts consistent with the interests of the
dominant coalition, but the results of those changes need not be consistent with their
intentions.  Although members of the natural state coalition may deliberately make
institutional or organizational changes, their purpose is typically not to initiate or further
the transition process.
LC 3) The transition occurs in historical time through a series of reinforcing changes in
institutions, systems, and individual behaviors. Incremental increases in access must be
sustained by the existing political and economic systems at each step along the way.
The logical conditions, requiring that the explanation of the transition must begin with behavior
consistent with the logic of the natural state, allows us to trace through a set of changes in
institutions, organizations, and behavior that can support movements toward open access.
VII. 1 The doorstep conditions and impersonal exchange51
34On the economic side, Ian Morris finds using evidence from anthropometric measures
and material culture that the standard of living in classical Greece may have been twice as high
as in dark age Greece.  Steckel and Rose’s review the anthropometric evidence from the
Americas, The Backbone of History, shows distinctly different standards of living in different
societies and places.  On the political side one only needs to think of the differences in political
structures between Athens, Sparta, and the other Greek city states, or the differences between
Venice, Florence, Genoa, Milan, and the other Italian city states to see both the variety and
constantly changing structure of politics.  For a specific example, Machiavelli’s The Prince and
Discourses on Livy document the rapidly changing political structures and fortunes of Florence
at the end of the 15
th century.
The internal structures of every natural state typically undergoes regular, if episodic
change.  Regimes and dynasties rise and fall, relative prices continuously adjust, climates
fluctuate, neighboring competitors appear and disappear, and boundaries and borders shift. The
wide variety of possible forms that can be taken by political and economic systems within a
natural state produce different economic and political outcomes.
34  Moreover, as the
circumstances of a natural state shift, so to do these outcomes. Out of these shifting patterns,
societies occasionally produce arrangements with a better chance of making the transition to
open access.  Historically in the west, societies in Athenian Greece, Republic Rome, and the
Renaissance city-states of Northern Italy appear to have been on the doorstep of the transition,
although all three failed to produce modern open access societies.  
We begin our analysis of the transition by asking what are the characteristics of some
natural states that make them ripe for a transition and, then, that allow them to sustain the
transition?
The central feature of the transition is the development of impersonal exchange among
elites.  Personal exchange involves a personal, on-going relationship between the exchange
parties so that repeated dealings can be a central aspect of exchange enforcement. If one party52
cheats another, they risk losing the relationship and the benefits it implies. The necessity for
repeated interaction limits the range of exchanges of any one individual. 
In contrast, impersonal exchange involves parties without long-term personal
relationships who may make a single exchange. Impersonal exchange requires that the parties to
the exchange be confident enough that their rights and obligations will be secure despite the
absence of repeated dealings. Impersonal exchange therefore requires some form of third-party
enforcement.
In all its systems, the natural state builds on personal exchange, personal relationships,
and personal obligations.  Impersonal exchange among elites in a natural state cannot develop
until specific conditions are met.  We call these the doorstep conditions.  Once the doorstep
conditions are in place, it is possible, but not inevitable, for impersonal exchange among elites to
serve as the wedge that eventually opens access in the polity and economy.
The three doorstep conditions are:
DC 1) Rule of law for elites.
DC 2) Perpetual forms of organizations for elites (including the state itself).
DC 3) Political control of the military.
The doorstep conditions build on one another.  The creation of perpetually lived
organizations for elites requires the existence of rule of law for elites.  The creation of political
control over the military requires both elite rule of law and elite perpetual organizations.  All
three conditions are necessary to establish impersonal exchange within elites.  We discuss each
condition in turn.53
35We mean unbiased in the sense that the laws are applied fairly, not that the laws are fair. 
Natural state legal systems very often distinguish between different individuals on the basis of
status, so there is no sense that rule of law for elites in a natural state implies that all elites are
treated the same.  But rule of law for elites does imply that all individuals of a certain class or
standing are treated the same within the framework of the law.
DC 1) Rule of law for elites. Every natural state is an organization, a group of
individuals bound together by mutual interests and threats. Their constant interaction inevitably
gives rise to habits of interaction that form customary behavior and lead to the possibility of
creating rules, both informal and formal, governing specific relationships within elites.  Defining
elite rights and adjudicating disputes among elites about their rights is a fundamental part of any
natural state. The relative success of a natural state depends on the state’s ability to structure
sustainable relations among elites.  All natural states accomplish this by identifying individuals
within the elites who perform arbitration and mediation functions. In some, but by no means all,
natural states, these functions become formalized into a machinery of government and justice. 
As we stressed earlier, the origin of property rights and legal systems is the definition of elite
rights in the natural state.
Rule of law requires the establishment of a judicial system in which individuals with the
appropriate legal standing have access to laws and courts whose decisions are binding and
unbiased, at least with respect to elites.
35  Rule of law is not, of course, a binary variable; the
extent and dimensions of rule of law vary continuously and from society to society. 
Part of rule of law for elites involves legal support for organizational forms.  Entities
within society, for example, the church, are identified as enjoying certain privileges and
properties as part of public law, that part of the law that structures the state.  The privileges of
elites are typically defined not as individual rights but as privileges associated with the particular54
office in an organization recognized by the state.  The king, the pope, the archbishops, and the
earls, for example, may all enjoy privileges associated with the office that they hold.  
DC 2) Perpetual forms of organizations for elites (including the state itself). A
perpetually lived organization is an organization that lives beyond the life of its individual
members.  For example, a partnership is not a perpetual organization, since the partnership must
be reformed on the death (or withdrawal) of any partner.  A corporation is a perpetually lived
organization because its structure allows it to live beyond the life of any and all members who
create it, and no single member (excepting the obvious case of a single individual with majority
control) can dissolve the corporation at will. Organizations that exist at the pleasure of the king
or any leader can never be perpetually lived. Perpetual life is therefore not eternal life, but a life
that is on-going.
A perpetually lived organization cannot exist in the absence of a legal system capable of
enforcing rule of law regarding the organization.  In legal parlance, the organization must
become a “person” in the eyes of the law, capable of bearing rights and duties.  Perpetual life is
not a binary variable, since there are many dimensions along which perpetual organizations can
be structured and allowed to exist.
It is important to grasp a fine distinction about the legal arrangements that support
organizations.  In general, legal systems may or may not provide an individual office holder (or
the members of the organization) with the power to bind the behavior of his (their) successors. 
We observe many organizations that persist through time, with stable and durable internal
arrangements, yet the officers and members of the organization are unable to credibly bind their
successors in the future to honor obligations made today.  Durability of the institutional55
36In the European debate over the nature of sovereignty and, ultimately, about the divine
rights of popes and monarchs, there were several stands in the supporters of the divine rights of
kings that were inconsistent with the creation of a perpetual organization for the state.  One
central issue was whether the King was above or below the law, which was closely related to the
question of whether the kings mandate came from God or from society.
arrangements within an organization does not, in itself, give that organization perpetual life.  A
perpetual lived organization lives on beyond the lives of its members.  A promise made by the
organization today is a promise that will be honored in the future regardless of the identity of the
individual members of the organization in the future.  As a result, perpetually lived organizations
require the identification of a set of organizational forms recognized by the state and courts
whose organizational life extends beyond the lives of the organization’s individual members.
An example may help make the difference clear.  After the Roman imperium was
established, the emperors often left wills detailing how their property was to be distributed
among their heirs, even naming an heir as the next emperor, and part of the property of the
emperor was the ability to dispose of certain government functions.  The wishes of dead
emperors, however, were routinely ignored by their successors.  Actual successors occasionally
even killed the named heir to the imperium.  Many of the institutions surrounding the emperor
persisted through time for many centuries.  But little about the actual organizations surrounding
the emperor could be said to be perpetual.  An agreement with one emperor could be overturned
by his successor with impunity. Indeed, a durable part of the empire’s institutional structure was
that the emperor was above the law, that he was sovereign, that he could not be bound by his
predecessors and in turn, that he could not bind his successors.
36  Even though many institutions
of the Roman empire persisted over a very long period, at its heart the empire was not a
perpetually lived organization. Roman institutions and organizations were durable, but not56
perpetually lived.  Agreements made with one emperor could not necessarily be enforced against
the emperor who followed.
Historically, the development of a rule of law for elites necessarily entailed, among other
things, the development of legal support for elite organizational forms. Support for elite
organizational forms is an integral part of the institutional structure of a mature natural state. 
Elite organizations within the natural state, however, are usually not perpetually lived
organizations.  Access to organizational forms and the rights that specific organizations enjoy are
usually part of the ongoing negotiations over the distribution of rents within the dominant
coalition.  An organization’s identity depends on the identity of its members, particularly of the
member who heads it.  Elite organizations may be durable, but most are not perpetually lived. 
As European history showed repeatedly, kings whose predecessors who had borrowed money
often felt no binding legal obligations to honor their predecessors debts.  Creditors in medieval
Europe did not loan money to a perpetual organization, of which the king was an impersonal
head, but to an organization whose particular structure and obligations varies with the identity of
its members. 
If a natural state that cannot credibly commit to honor its agreements beyond the lives of
the current members of the dominant coalition, then it cannot credibly commit to enforce the
agreements of an elite organization whose life extends beyond the lives of its members.  This
logic implies that the creation of perpetually lived elite organizations requires that the state itself
become a perpetually lived organization. A mortal state cannot credibly commit to support
perpetually lived contractual organizations; nothing about a successor state impels it to honor the57
37North and Weingast (1989) provide a central example of how the British state made
itself a perpetual organization when it provided secure credible commitments to repay debts by
locating the liability for the debts in the “king-in-parliament.” The “king-in-parliament” is a
perpetually lived organization that lives beyond the lives of its individual members.
38Should the creation of a perpetually lived state be a doorstep condition or a doorstep
pre-condition?  For the present, we tentatively answer yes, but observe that the answer is not
obvious. As the section on open access orders stressed, the theory of the double balance requires
that economic and political institutions match.  Creating a powerful and persistent political
organization like a perpetually lived state cannot happen in the realm of politics alone.  Credibly
committing to perpetual lived state probably requires the simultaneous development of powerful
elite economic and political organizations. Put differently, perpetuity of the state and
organizations may have to develop simultaneously.
39Political control of the military is very close to what today we would call civilian
control of a professional army.  
organizations created by the old one.
37  The second doorstep condition requires development of
perpetual life for states as the most important elite organization.
38
The creation of perpetually lived corporations in itself directly creates a form of
impersonal exchange.  Contracts and agreements are made with the organization, not with
individual members of the organization.  Those contracts extend beyond the life of any
individual member as well.
DC 3) Political control of the military. The third doorstep condition is political control
of the military.
39  Before we can discuss this issue intelligently, we have to dispose of the
seemingly omnipresent notion that the state is that entity with a monopoly on the legitimate use
of violence (Weber, 1947). The state in a limited access order is a coalition of powerful
individuals and groups.  The state is always an organization, never an individual.  Collectively,
the groups in the dominant coalition of a natural state may possess a monopoly on violence
within society, but that in no way implies that within the dominant coalition itself that one group
or one individual controls the military forces available to the coalition.  Indeed, the logic of the58
natural state implies that it is unlikely that a dominant coalition will allow one group or faction
to control all the military resources of the coalition.  The simple reason is that the factions
without military resources cannot defend themselves, so that the faction controlling the military
would extract all the surplus available to the coalition.  That creates strong incentives for non-
military factions to arm themselves and become military factions.  As a result, we rarely observe
a natural state in history where one group within the dominant coalition has consolidated control
of the military. The main implication is that, few natural states possess a monopoly on the use of
violence.
Political control of the military requires a set of conditions: the existence of an
organization with control over all the military resources of the country; control over the various
military assets is consolidated in that organization; and there exists a set of credible conventions
that describe how force is used against coalition members. Almost always, the organization that
controls the military is a political organization embedded in the larger structure of the
government, such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the United States.  Societies experiencing a civil
war do not, by definition, have political control of the military.  Societies in Europe under
feudalism or the Middle East under the Ottomans did not have political control of the military, as
armed and dangerous elements of the population were spread throughout the dominant coalition
and throughout society as well.
In most natural states, control of the military is not consolidated, it is unevenly
distributed throughout the dominant coalition.  The ability to threaten military action is one of
the credible threats that keeps the dominant coalition stable.  In our sense, neither Britain nor
France had political control of the military until sometime in the eighteenth century. Nor, until59
40 Europe from the end of the Roman Empire until perhaps 1700 was such a society, the
Ottoman empire seems to have been such a society, as is any other society where the means of
violence are widely spread through the population and control over and an ability to use violence
is a critical part of obtaining membership in the dominant coalition.
then, did the monarchy in either country have a monopoly on violence or the uncontested control
of the military for any substantial period of time. In both countries, a coalition of military,
economic, religious and political groups maintained an uneasy balance in which civil war was
always a credible threat and a regular reality.
Political control of the military is a subtle problem.  Nothing precludes a faction within a
natural state from taking control of the military resources.  But such a natural state is very likely
to be a tyranny, not a society on the doorstep.  And such a state is unlikely to sustain political
control of the military for long, since the factions and groups in the dominant coalition without
the means to protect themselves have no reason to believe that the commitments made to them
will be honored.
In most natural states the absence of political control of the military is simply a fact of
life.  Indeed, the ability of the natural state to contain violence depends in an important way on
the balance of military power within the dominant coalition.  The ability to provide a modicum
of stability in the face of dispersed military power is one of the natural state’s major advantages,
and it usually requires a balance of dispersed military power.
As shown above in the discussion of the natural state, a society without political control
of the military, non-military elite members – traders, producers, priests, educators, and others –
must ally themselves with a militarily potent member of the coalition in case civil war breaks
out.
40  Because contracts across these factions are vulnerable in times of violence, they are less
likely to be undertaken. Natural states with elite rule of law and support for elite organizations,60
41Most states have multiple military organizations: army, navy, etc.  Barzel (2001) argues
that division of the military into branches may be a way to weaken the possibility of using the
military for political purposes.  But despite their branches, most states also have a mechanism of
unified command that is answerable to an identifiable political authority.  Every open access
order has some structure for providing political control over the military, most natural states do
not.
42In the open access section, we identified the need for open access orders to develop
clear rules about when and how the government can legitimately use violence. 
43This the small “c” constitution, the actual structure of the state arrangements, and not
necessarily a written document.
but without political control of the military, limit the range of impersonal exchange among elites.
Political control of the military removes this source of contractual risk and thus extends the
range and scope of contracts among elites.
Because centralizing military power in a single organization poses an enormous threat to
the dominant coalition, consolidated political authority is extremely unlikely in a natural state.
41 
In order to sustain political authority over a consolidated military, the non-military members of
the dominant coalition must be credibly convinced that military force will not be used to
expropriate their wealth and their rents by expelling them from the coalition.  The group that
controls the military must therefore be lodged within the natural state in such a way that the state
controls the group’s use of the military or controls the circumstances under which the group uses
the military.
42 
The mechanism(s) that enables a centralized military to credibly commit to not abuse its
powers must contain two elements.  First, the dominant coalition must agree about what
constitutes the legitimate use of violence – that is, a constitutional agreement
43 – so that violation
triggers a widespread reaction against the initial use of force.  Second, the non-military groups
must be capable of effectively disciplining the government and the military.  61
44In medieval Europe, the establishment of rule of law, both within the church through
canon law, and in secular political units via the civil law, was based on the acceptance or
reception of Roman Law as represented by the Code of Justinian.  Justinian’s Code provided a
great example of the natural state when it stated as one of its maxims, quoted over and over by
medieval scholastics, quod principi placuit vigorem legis habet: “What pleases the prince has the
force of law.”
45The creation of the first chartered business corporations in the 16
th century resulted
from the British elites’ desire to exploit opportunities for foreign trade within a framework of
monopoly.  The first business incorporation was the Russia Company, which had a monopoly on
the British trade with Russia, and was owned exclusively by powerful aristocrats.
The existence of powerful, well organized, and viable non-military organizations
strengthens both of the two elements of political control of the military. Non-military
organizations serve as focal points for coordinating the reaction to a non-sanctioned use of force,
and non-military organizations can credibly threaten the military with economic sanctions.
Sustainable political control of the military, as a result, depends on existence of powerful non-
military elite organizations. The existence of those organizations in turn depends on rule of law
for elites and perpetual organizations for elites.  Political control of the military is the most
problematic of the three doorstep conditions for societies to attain.
Implications.  The doorstep conditions are at once institutional and organizational
outcomes. All three conditions meet LC 1: they are consistent with the logic of the natural state. 
The establishment of laws and courts is the means by which the dominant coalition regularizes
relations among elites.
44  Perpetually lived organizations are a natural vehicle for limiting entry
and generating rents in a systematic manner.
45  By consolidating military power under control of
the political system, a monopoly on violence can reduce the frequency of violence in a state. 
A powerful implication of all three doorstep condition is that they greatly expand the
range of specialization and exchange. Rule of law for elites extends the range of contracts and
relationships among elites, allow mutual dependency to exist that could not survive without62
some form of legal protection. Perpetually lived organizations create more powerful
organizations, so they can undertake a wider range of economic activities than non-perpetually
lived ones. And political control of the military has two effects. First, it greatly reduces threats of
violence, so defensive violence as protection against threats is far less likely to disrupt trade.
Reducing this risk extends the range of gains from exchange, especially across factions of
violence. Second, reducing threats of expropriation also increases the range of gains from
exchange. In short, natural states that move to the doorstep typically become wealthier.
The three doorstep condition enable us to understand how a transition can occur in a way
that satisfies LC 3, the condition that incremental changes which open access occur are
incentive-compatible throughout the process.  The fundamental insight is that the three doorstep
conditions combine to make impersonal exchange within the elite possible.  Natural states are
typically built on hierarchies of personal relationships.  As natural states grow in complexity and
sophistication, individual relationships among elites are ordered by status, and status remains an
individual identifying characteristic.  The delineation of privileges associated with individuals of
different status with specific individuals in a specific position in the hierarchy can lead to more
sophisticated bodies of rules and behavior patterns that ultimately result in a legal system. 
Complex natural states therefore all have patronage or clientelistic structures that reflect the
hierarchical structure of personal exchange.
Patronage networks, kinship groups, or ethnic organizations are rational ways to organize
exchange and collective coordinated behavior in a world without rule of law or support for
durable, and eventually, perpetual organizations (Greif 2005).  But even in a world with rule of63
law for elites and perpetual organizations for elites, these relational networks persist, and
impersonal exchange is limited.  
Political control of the military enables non-military elites to dispense with need to
maintain personal relationships within networks tied to militarily powerful individuals. This, in
turn, opens the door to expanded use of elite organizations for trade, education, and production. 
These new elite organizations can utilize impersonal exchange, specifically by utilizing the
identity of the perpetually lived organization in exchange rather than the personal identity of the
organization’s members.  The Bank of England or the Bank of the United States were impersonal
organizations whose perpetual life as legal “persons” enabled individuals to deal with the Banks
with confidence,  even without any personal connection to the bankers.  Once elite exchange
becomes impersonal exchange, new possibilities begin to open up.
VII.2 Transition mechanisms
The doorstep conditions create the possibility of impersonal exchange within elites.  Elite
impersonal exchange, in turn, expands the set of individuals with whom elites transact and
contract.  The next question to address is when will the expansion of elite impersonal exchange
lead to a permanent and sustainable increase in access?  The central problem is explaining how
the self-limiting nature of the natural state can be overcome so that access can gradually widen.
The logic of the argument follows the development of impersonal exchange among elites. 
The doorstep conditions fosters impersonal elite exchange which, in turn, creates incentives
extend access at the margin to institutions that support impersonal exchange.  For example,
increasing the number of people who have access to the elite legal system increases the range of64
elite contracts and hence the gains from exchange they potentially capture. When elites see this
extension to their advantage, access natural states have an incentive to increase access.
Moreover, having created the institutional mechanisms for maintain rule of law among elites,
natural states on the doorstep can make the necessary credible commitments to margin increases
in access at relatively low cost.
Similarly, impersonal elite exchange creates indirect incentives to extend the range of
organizations supported by the state to include non-elite individuals.  For example, the state may
create the means to honor the rights of all stockholders in a joint stock company and making
shares widely tradable. 
To neutralize the self-limiting tendencies of the natural state, elites must in general be
better off by the expansion of access.  We call the ways by which large numbers of elites benefit
from widening access transition mechanisms. Transition mechanisms are the elements of social
arrangements that can potentially make most elites better off as access opens, thus blunting the
threat of reorganizing the dominant coalition.  Transition mechanisms provide concrete ways in
which opening access can become self-sustaining.  These mechanisms are also a type of positive
feedback process in which small changes generate new forces to amplify the change.
Perhaps the most important transition mechanism is the fiscal mechanism.  If changes in
access generate a significant fiscal return to the state, and the fiscal benefits of more open access
can be shared throughout the dominant coalition, it is possible for a small change to survive.  For
example, in the early nineteenth century United States, all the states tightly regulated entry into
banking.  In the 1810's Massachusetts set up a system of taxing bank capital.  The intent of the
tax was to limit entry!  But the state soon realized it obtained more revenue from the tax on bank65
46See Wallis, Sylla, and Legler “Taxation and Regulation of Banking.”
47The traditional story that the enclosure movement in Britain produced a situation where
sheep were eating men is a reflection of the importance of sheep raising and wool production to
the dominant coalition in Britain into the 18
th and 19
th century.
capital than from dividends on bank stock in the banks the state was trying to protect.  The state
decided to sell its bank stock, and proceeded to allow open entry into banking.  By the early
1830s, the state of Massachusetts received over 50 percent of its revenues from the tax on bank
capital and had more banks and more bank capital than any state in the country.  Several New
England states copied Massachusetts, and open access incorporation in banking, what is called
“free banking” in the United States, began spreading widely in the 1840s.
46  
We have identified three other possible transition mechanisms, and there may be more. 
The first is a regulatory mechanism.  Regulation of economic activity is a classic way to create
rents.  But occasionally attempts to create rents on one margin open access on another. For
example, when the fourteenth century English regulated the export of raw wool by creating a
state monopoly, they also allowed open entry into wool production.  Because most sheep were
raised on aristocratic estates, this did not create a problem for the dominant coalition, but it
opened the door for future competition.
47 
The second transition mechanism is the institutions surrounding representation. The
creation of methods of representation within a natural state, for example, parliament in Britain,
may induce marginal increases in representation in the future that can be self-sustaining. 
The third mechanism is international competition, both military and economic.  Societies
may find themselves in competition with another society, and the nature of that competition may
provide incentives for opening access.  This can occur because the appropriate military
technology requires mass participation, and thus encourages marginal opening of political access66
48For example, see the role played by the draft in broadening suffrage in Alex Keyssar
The Right to Vote, and Margaret Levi’s book on conscription, Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism
(1997).
49The economic changes induced by changes in the way in which British ships were
provisioned, as well as the way they were built and repaired, is explored by N.A.M Rogers,
Command of the Ocean.  Of particular interest is the decision to use competitive contracting to
raise the quality of provisions.
for soldiers, as in the oft cited case of the Greek hoplites.
48  It may also occur because military
competition stimulates economic development, as in the case of the British naval development in
the late eighteenth century.
49  The recent economic success of China appears to be making it
much easier for the dominant coalition in India to accept institutional changes that open access in
India.
Tracing how these mechanisms work is a task for future theoretical development and
thick history, as the transition path through each countries history will be unique in many
respects.  
VII. 3. Transitions, Institutional flexibility, and the importance of the doorstep conditions
The final important aspect of the doorstep conditions is how they enable institutional
change during the transition to occur more readily. This is one of the most powerful, yet subtle
aspects of being on the doorstep.  We have already suggested that a key to the transition is
understanding how the same institution can work differently under different circumstances, now
we flesh out that assertion.
Let us begin with an example that does not apply directly to the doorstep conditions, but
one that is dramatically affected by the transition: elections.  The complexity of elections as an
institution enables us to say that although Argentina, Mexico, Russia, and the United States all67
hold elections, they are not all democracies in the same way; or, put differently, elections do not
mean the same thing in the four countries.  
Elections work differently in the presence of political competition. The distinction holds
for Argentina, Russia, Mexico, and the United States, where the presence of viable political
parties and candidates has been a critical influence on how the institution of elections actually
work.  Similarly, open access to political and social organizations also affects elections. In other
words, the presence or absence of political organizations directly affects how elections actually
work.  If only one political organization is supported by the state, then elections are not a
mechanism capable of mobilizing political competition.
The nature and degree of competition in any society is determined by the ability of
organizations to form, enter new lines of activity, and compete with each other.  As we have
stressed, an important element of the natural state is limiting access to organizational forms. 
Many, perhaps most, institutions operate differently under conditions of open access competition
than they do under limited access.  As a result, whether the institutional support for organizations
in society allows entry has a fundamental effect on how other institutions in that society
function.  Following our example, allowing entry into political organizations fundamentally
changes the nature of elections, even in the absence of institutional change in the structure of the
elections themselves.  The main implication of this argument is that opening entry on the right
dimensions, even if the initial opening is small enough to be tolerated within the natural state,
may change the way other institutions in the society work.  
This paper is overlong already, and a detailed exposition of how the doorstep condition
create institutions consistent with the natural state that are easily adapted to open access must68
50Indeed, Adam Smith criticizes corporations in his Wealth of Nations for precisely this
reason.
51In fact, Hurst argues in his classic The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation, that
general incorporation acts requiring open access to corporate charters in the United States did
not represent a major institutional change in the United States because legislatures were already
granting charters to anyone who wanted one.  Hurst’s conclusion is overdrawn, special charters
in many lines of activity and in many states were not given to everyone who wanted one and
charters sometimes did grant special privileges.  Hurst is probably right that, by 1840, many
charters issued by state legislatures had become standardized.  See Wallis (2005),  Cadman
(1949), Dodd (1954), and Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2004).  For the operation of the behavior
patterns in banking in the United States see Wallis, Sylla, and Legler (1994).
wait for another time.  An example may suffice. The corporation is an organizational form that
evolved over a long period of time.  Early corporations were created explicitly to generate rents
by giving one group privileged access to an organizational form, sometimes in combination with
explicit limits on competition and often in return for the group providing a valuable public
service.  The first corporations in early modern Europe were pure natural state creations,
explicitly designed to generate rents through limited entry.
50
Once the corporation had been accepted as a legitimate organizational form, however, it
was actually relatively easy to make minor changes in the institution itself that had dramatic
effects on the polity and economy.  By the 1790s, institutional support for perpetually lived
corporations was in place in England, France, the low Countries, and the United States, but in
none of these countries was access to corporate forms open access in any meaningful way.  It
was, however, relatively easy to change one aspect of the institution: the behavioral norm
regarding the number of charters that would be issued.  Increasing the number of charters issued
could be accomplished within the existing institutional rules, behaviors, and beliefs.
51  In this
way, allowing open access to corporate charters to any citizen who met minimum requirements –
as occurred in the early nineteenth century Britain, France and the United States –69
simultaneously eliminated the rent-creation associated with limited entry, increased the level of
competition in many markets, and extended the ability of businesses to extract gains from
exchange. 
Inventing the idea of a limited liability, perpetually lived corporate entity from scratch
would have been an enormously difficult undertaking.  But in the early nineteenth century the
United States, Britain, and France all adopted open access general incorporation procedures that
made corporate charters widely available.  This institutional change had enormous implications
for the operation of the polity and economy, but it was, in itself, a relatively modest institutional
change.  The doorstep conditions contribute to the transition by creating institutions consistent
with natural state that can be modified to operate in open access orders with only minor
modifications.
VII.4 Conclusions 
To summarize, the doorstep conditions contribute to the transition in two ways.  First, the
conditions make possible impersonal exchange among elites.  Creating impersonal exchange
among elites does not necessarily produce a transition.  But to the extent that transition
mechanisms enhance the positive effects of marginal increases in access to organizational forms
by producing fiscal or political benefits for the dominant coalition, access can continue to open
without an intention on the part of elites to create a more open system (LC 3).
Second, the doorstep conditions may lead to increased access to organizational forms
among elites.  The increase in access may fundamentally change the way that other institutions
in the system operate.  As a result, important pieces of the transition may occur without obvious70
52This analysis of the transition suggests that empirical observations of institutional
structures during the transition, ala the current cross country studies, may be deeply misleading. 
If the same institution can support limited access and open access, there is a serious empirical
problem to deal with.  
or overt institutional change.  If an increase in access to economic or religious organizational
forms takes place when the doorstep is attained or the transition proceeds, it is possible that the
nature of political institutions, such as elections, will be changed.  
The doorstep conditions are compatible with both limited access and open access.  If
institutions are in place when a society begins a transition process that can easily be adapted to
open access or, if the function of other institutions are affected by increasing access, then that
society faces a less difficult task in making the transition.  The fundamental institutions to have
in place are the doorstep conditions. 
52
VIII. Conclusions
The conceptual framework presented in this paper presents an integrated theory of politics and
economics.  All developed countries in the world today have both competitive democracies and
competitive market economies. This connection strongly suggests that theories of economics that
take politics as exogenous and theories of politics that take economics as exogenous are
incapable of explaining the process of modern social development.  Our framework integrates
both. It suggests three major conclusions. 
First, limited access orders have been the default option for human societies over the last
ten thousand years.  We have termed the political and economic structure of the limited access
order the natural state for a reason: it is the natural form of human society.  The implications for71
development policy are enormous.  Natural states are not failed states, they are typically not
produced by evil men with evil intentions, and they are not the result of pathologies in the
structure of these societies.  Nothing is unnatural about natural states.  And because natural states
are not sick, policy medicine will not cure them.
Limited access orders manipulate the economy to produce rents and then systematically
use those rents to create political stability.  The result is a modicum of social order, an increase
in specialization and division of labor, and economic growth.  Natural states vary enormously. 
In terms of  politics, economics, violence, and culture, some limited access orders are more
successful than others.  No forces inherent in the logic, social  structure, or historical dynamics
of limited access orders inevitably lead them to become open access orders.  Because natural
states have internal forces built on exclusion, privilege, and rent-creation, they are stable orders.
They are therefore extremely difficult to transform.
Second, open access orders maintain open access to political, economic, and other social
organizations.  Access to organizations vitalizes competition in all systems, and competition
sustains the social order.  Economic and political systems are just as intimately connected in an
open access order as in a limited access order, but the connections lie at a deeper level.  In an
open access order, economics appears to be independent of politics. This seeming independence
is reflected both the famous classical liberal dictum about limited government and in neoclassic
economic’s view that markets are antecedent to government and that the government intervenes
into markets.  A competitive economy requires not only a state that maintains open access, entry,
defines property rights, and enforces competition, it also requires a state that is capable of
providing the social infrastructure that sustains perpetually lived and extremely sophisticated and72
53Moreover, none of these countries were the focus of international donor agencies.
complicated organizations.  The modern business enterprises and thriving modern markets
cannot exist outside the institutional framework provided by open access polities.  
Similarly, political scientists have ignored the critical role that a competitive open access
economy plays in sustaining open access politics and competitive democracies.  Modern western
democracies could not exist without being embedded in competitive market economies
characterized by competition as Schumpeter described it: creative destruction resulting from
competition between large, well organized, and technologically innovative economic entities. 
Modern social science is as far from understanding how open access social orders work as they
are from understanding how limited access social orders work.
Third, our perspective redefines the problem of economic development. In contrast to the
perspective in modern economics, our framework suggests that economic development is not an
incremental process, such as gaining more education, capital, and making marginal
improvements in the rule of law. Each of these can improve a developing limited access order by
moving it a bit toward the doorstep conditions, but these incremental changes can take a limited
access order only so far: they are not the process of development. 
The process of economic development is instead the movement from a limited access
order to an open access order. This process is very difficult to engineer. Despite the massive
attention to economic development by international donor agencies, only eight countries have
made this transformation since WWII.
53 Our approach implies that development requires a
transformation in society from a limited access to an open access basis. This transformation takes
place through what we have called creating the doorstep conditions, which represent a radical73
change in both the state and society: rule of law for elites; perpetual life for organizations,
including the state; and political control of the military. Each of these changes increases the
gains from specialization and exchange; they also create mechanisms that underpin impersonal
exchange. For this reason, natural state on the doorstep are wealthier. Moreover, the doorstep
conditions create incentives to make incremental increases in open access that can transform a
natural state on the doorstep into an open access state.
We are only beginning to understand how politics and economics interact in either
limited or open access social orders. Moreover, we know even less about the transition from one
social order to the other: the process of economic and political development.  Until we
understand the fundamental nature of social orders, we have no chance of explaining how states
transition from one to the other.  
Social science is the study of how human beings interact to produce the complicated
social structures we all live in.  It follows that our primary focus must be on organizations, how
groups of people organize their relationships in durable, and eventually, perpetual forms of
interaction.  Organizations are the key to understanding how societies perform, and institutions
are the key to understanding how organizations form and behave.  Competitive economic and
political societies are impossible without open access to organizational forms.  Understanding
how societies have managed to sustain open access to organizational forms is the heart of
understanding modern development.  7475
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